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CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT AND THE DOCTRINE OF  
STARE DECISIS IN TRIAL AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE LEVEL CHARTER 
ANALYSIS 
Adryan J.W. Toth* 
I. Introduction 
With the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 (“Charter”) turning 30 
years old, a new phenomenon is emerging within constitutional jurisprudence. As 
our society evolves, so too does our constitutional law. What happens, however, 
when both evolve to the point where the validity of prior precedent—including 
from our highest court—is called into question in fact and law? Two recent cases 
have brought this issue to the forefront of both the media and legal theory: Bedford 
v Attorney (General Canada)2 and Carter v Canada (Attorney General).3 The sub-
ject matter of these cases renders them, from their outset, controversial in society,4 
as they speak to some fundamental moral principles in competing ways. The latter 
is a more recent case from the British Columbia Superior Court, whereby Smith J. 
struck down subsection 241(b) of the Criminal Code,5 the provision that prohibits 
                                                                                                                                                         
* Adryan J.W. Toth has earned B.Comm., J.D., and LL.M. degrees from the University of Saskatchewan. 
He will soon join the law firm of MacPherson Leslie & Tyerman LLP in Regina, SK where he will work 
in the litigation department. His main academic interests are constitutional law, criminal law, and juris-
prudence/legal theory. He has presented at conferences both nationally and internationally and plans to 
pursue further graduate studies. Adryan is greatly indebted to Professor Dwight G. Newman for his 
insightful criticisms and thoughtful suggestions on this paper.  
 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
2 2010 ONSC 4264, 327 DLR (4th) 52 aff’d in part 2012 ONCA 186, 346 DLR (4th) 385 [Bedford]. Note 
that the majority opinion of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the application judge did not err in 
engaging a constitutional analysis, despite there being Supreme Court of Canada authority on the topic, 
because the issues in the two cases were distinct (at paras 61-70). In other words, the ONCA was of the 
view that Bedford was distinguishable from any prior binding authority. 
3 2012 BCSC 886, [2012] BCJ No 1196 [Carter]. 
4 See e.g. Tracey Tyler, “Prostitution laws struck down,” thestar.com (28 September 2010) online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/867332--prostitution-laws-struck-down>; Shannon Kari, 
“Ontario judge strikes down prostitution laws,” National Post (28 September 2010) online: <http://news. 
nationalpost.com/2010/09/28/ontario-judge-strikes-down-prostitution-laws>; and Sunny Dhillon, “B.C. 
Supreme Court strikes down ban on physician-assisted suicide” The Globe and Mail (15 June 2012) 
online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/bc-supreme-court-strikes-down-ban 
-on-physician-assisted-suicide/article4267631>. 
5 RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code]. 
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the counselling or aiding of suicide.6 The former, and the case that forms the un-
derlying subject matter of this paper, was a decision by Himel J. of the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice (“ONSC”), whereby she struck down numerous provi-
sions of the Criminal Code related to prostitution.7 In both cases, the application 
judges wrote lengthy and comprehensive decisions, presenting strong reasons in 
support of striking down the impugned provisions, and did so despite there being 
precedent from the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) that upheld the constitu-
tionality of those same provisions.8 
Bedford, having now been heard and decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
(“ONCA”), is on its natural and inevitable progression towards the SCC. Indeed, 
the Court has just recently granted leave to hear a final appeal in the case,9 and as 
its journey continues, its controversy remains. While this controversy is partly due 
to the case’s subject matter (i.e. prostitution), it is also due in part to the fact that 
the case’s topics, arguments, and holdings relate to a wide variety of legal subject 
matter, including constitutional law,10 criminal law,11 evidence,12 and constitutional 
remedies.13 It is thus not all that surprising that ever since the trial decision was 
handed down on September 28, 2010, students, professors, lawyers, and similarly 
interested parties across the country have been considering and debating both the 
merits of its reasoning as well as its overall implications. 
Of particular importance to the topic of this paper, however, is that Bedford al-
so discusses a doctrinal matter that is fundamental to Canadian law in general: the 
doctrine of stare decisis. The case tests the doctrine’s continued relevance in an 
ever-evolving constitutional and societal context. As somewhat expected then, 
within the Bedford decision itself, there is a section devoted entirely to the doctrine 
of stare decisis.14 This paper will specifically focus on the implications arising from 
this section, placing particular emphasis on the roles of vertical and horizontal 
precedent in trial and intermediate appellate level Charter analysis. This discussion 
of precedent will lead into a deeper analysis of precedent in the constitutional con-
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Carter, supra note 3. 
7 Bedford, supra note 2. 
8 With respect to ibid, the SCC considered the constitutionality of, and ultimately upheld as constitu-
tional, certain prostitution related provisions, now ss 210, 212(1)(j), and 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 
in Reference re ss 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of Criminal Code (Canada), [1990] 1 SCR 1123, [1990] 4 WWR 481 
[Prostitution Reference]. With respect to Carter, supra note 3, the constitutionality of now  
s 241(b) was previously considered and upheld by a majority of the SCC in Rodriguez v British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR (4th) 342 [Rodriguez]. The application judge, after citing 
the ONCA’s reasoning in Bedford, distinguished Rodriguez by reasoning that the majority decision 
“[d]id not decide whether the right to life under s 7 was engaged by s 241(b) of the Criminal Code” at 
para 924. She then went on to find that the jurisprudence with respect to the principles of fundamental 
justice, especially regarding gross disproportionality and overbreadth, had materially evolved since 
Rodriguez, such that constitutionality should be revisited: at paras 973-85. The application judge then 
went on to find that there were new legislative and social facts such that a new s 1 analysis was required: 
at paras 942-48.  
9 Canada(Attorney General) v Bedford, [2012] SCCA No. 159. 
10 See generally Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 214-306, 369-507. 
11 See generally ibid at paras 229-278. 
12 See generally ibid at paras 84-213, 307-366. 
13 See generally ibid at paras 508-539. 
14 See generally ibid at paras 63-83. 
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text, culminating with the identification and explanation of a concept I call “prece-
dent expiration.” 
Before moving forward, however, it will prove useful at this point to provide 
some additional details with respect to the Bedford decision. In Bedford, Himel J. 
ruled that three Criminal Code provisions dealing with certain facets of prostitu-
tion (namely keeping a common bawdy house – section 210; living off of the avails 
of prostitution – 212(1)(j); and communicating for the purposes of prostitution – 
213(1)(c)) were unconstitutional and should therefore be struck down.15 This deci-
sion was ultimately based on the finding that all three Criminal Code provisions 
violated section 7 of the Charter and that section 213(1)(c) further violated subsec-
tion 2(b) of the Charter.16 Himel J. reached this decision notwithstanding the fact 
that, approximately 20 years prior, the SCC pronounced in the Prostitution Refer-
ence, that sections 210 (then section 193) and 213(1)(c) (then 195.1(1)(c)) were 
indeed constitutional.17 Himel J. was certainly not blind to this issue; in fact, she 
clearly acknowledged that the Prostitution Reference was “prima facie binding” up-
on her court.18 So it is here that lay the roots of two of several controversies found 
within Bedford: (1) the binding effect of a potentially ‘outdated’ SCC constitutional 
precedent: the Prostitution Reference; and (2) the role of stare decisis in trial level 
Charter analysis. Overall, it will be my intent throughout this paper to begin to 
untangle these two controversies. 
In this paper, I will argue that Himel J. was mistaken in her interpretation and 
use of the various authorities cited throughout the stare decisis section of her 
judgment, and that these errors call into question her justification for revisiting the 
constitutionality of certain Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution. In 
this regard, my criticisms of her judgment will be mostly restricted to the section 
dealing with stare decisis.19 I will ultimately argue that although the authorities cit-
ed by Himel J. do not provide support for a departure from stare decisis in the 
manner that she reasoned, there nevertheless are certain situations when a trial 
level judge would be permitted to revisit issues regarding a law’s constitutionality 
and/or permitted in rendering new constitutional determinations. 
The framework for this paper is as follows. In section II, I begin by describing 
the historical background and legal significance of both the Prostitution Reference 
and Bedford. I then, in section III, provide a brief overview of the doctrine of stare 
decisis, including a discussion of the unique and important differences between 
horizontal and vertical precedent. In section IV, I turn to provide a critique of 
Himel J.’s discussion of stare decisis in the Bedford case, including her use of au-
thorities from the SCC, the Ontario Court of Appeal (“ONCA”), and the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench (“SKQB”). This critique will naturally leave 
one wondering when it would be permissible for a trial judge to reconsider a law’s 
constitutionality, and I therefore move to discuss the SCC’s recent comments on 
retroactive versus prospective constitutional remedies in section V. The implica-
                                                                                                                                                         
15 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 3, 506-507. 
16 Ibid at paras 3, 506-507. 
17 See Prostitution Reference, supra note 8. 
18 Bedford, supra note 2 at para 66. 
19 See ibid at paras 63-83. These paragraphs consist of the section of the judgment that deals with stare 
decisis. 
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tions arising out of this discussion will provide the basis for my arguments in sec-
tion VI. In this section, I argue that there is one type of situation where a trial or 
intermediate appellate level judge may identify that a binding precedent has ‘ex-
pired,’ and two situations where the same may revisit issues regarding a law’s 
constitutionality. Throughout this section, I propose a series of tests to be used as 
an analytical framework for trial and intermediate appellate level judges engaging 
in a Charter analysis involving a “re-impugned”20 law.  
II. Factual Background 
At this time, it will prove instructive to explain the legal and factual context by 
which Bedford was brought to trial. It is also helpful to generally summarize the 
historical background and legal significance of the Prostitution Reference with re-
spect to Bedford. I begin with the latter because not only was it decided prior to 
Bedford, but it is also the legal precedent of the SCC which states that certain Crim-
inal Code provisions dealing with facets of prostitution are indeed constitutional. 
(i)  Prostitution Reference 
In Canada, Parliament has not expressly outlawed prostitution. Parliament has 
instead chosen to outlaw certain things that are associated with prostitution and 
this essentially has the effect of making prostitution illegal. For example, section 
210 of the Criminal Code makes it a criminal offence to keep a common bawdy 
house, and paragraph 213(1)(c) makes it a criminal offence to communicate with 
another person for the purposes of engaging in prostitution or procuring sexual 
services.21 It was the constitutionality of these provisions that the SCC was tasked 
with deciding in the Prostitution Reference. 
The Prostitution Reference began when Manitoba’s Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council chose to refer to the Manitoba Court of Appeal (“MBCA”) questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of then sections 193 (now section 210) and 195.1(1)(c) 
(now section 213(1)(c)) of the Criminal Code.22 The Lieutenant Governor in Coun-
cil made this decision after a Manitoba trial judge in R v Cunningham23 held that 
paragraph 195.1(1)(c) was unconstitutional and therefore of no force or effect.24 
After hearing arguments with respect to the impugned Criminal Code provisions’ 
constitutionality, all five justices of the MBCA agreed that the provisions were in-
deed constitutional.25 This decision was then appealed to the SCC, and on May 31, 
1990, the Court released its own opinion on the matter.  
                                                                                                                                                         
20 I use the term “re-impugned” to signify that the constitutionality of a law has already been properly 
considered and settled. In Bedford, the re-impugned laws are the specific Criminal Code provisions in 
question that relate to prostitution, i.e. ss 210 and 213(1)(c).  
21 See generally Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 210-213; see also Prostitution Reference, supra note 8 and 
Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 1-7. 
22 See generally Reference re ss 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Canada), [1987] 6 WWR 289, 60 
CR (3d) 216 [Manitoba Prostitution Reference]; see also supra note 8 at para 22. 
23 (1986), 31 CCC (3d) 223 (Man Prov Ct). 
24 See Prostitution Reference, supra note 8 at para 22. 
25 See generally Manitoba Prostitution Reference, supra note 22; see also ibid at paras 24-30 (Lamer J. 
helpfully discusses the history of the Manitoba Prostitution Reference). 
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The Prostitution Reference was heard by seven justices of the SCC,26 with the fi-
nal decision given by six27 of those justices—Dickson C.J.C. with La Forest and 
Sopinka JJ. concurring; Lamer J. offering a separate opinion; and Wilson J. with 
L’Heureux-Dubé in dissent. Dickson C.J.C. agreed with Wilson J. that paragraph 
213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code represented a prima facie infringement of subsec-
tion 2(b) of the Charter. Unlike Wilson J., however, Dickson C.J.C. believed that 
the infringement was reasonably justified under section 1.28 Dickson C.J.C. further 
held that sections 210 and 213(1)(c) did not, either separately or in combination, 
infringe section 7 of the Charter.29 Lamer J. found an infringement of subsection 
2(b) of the Charter, but, like Dickson C.J.C., ultimately held that such an infringe-
ment was reasonably justified under section 1.30 Lamer J. further held that the 
impugned provisions did not infringe section 7 and were therefore constitutional.31 
Notwithstanding Wilson J.’s dissent, Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J.’s judgments 
together formed the final holding of the case, namely that sections 210 and 
213(1)(c) were constitutional. It is this holding that became the prima facie binding 
precedent to be followed by future courts, including the ONSC in Bedford.32 
(ii)  Bedford v Attorney General (Canada) 
Approximately 20 years after the SCC rendered its decision in the Prostitution 
Reference, three individuals—Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch, and Valerie Scott 
(together referred to as the “applicants”)—brought an application seeking an order 
declaring that sections 210, 212(1)(j), and 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code were un-
                                                                                                                                                         
26 The seven justices were Dickson C.J.C. (as he then was), and McIntyre, Lamer, La Forest, L’Heureux 
Dubé, and Sopinka JJ. 
27 McIntyre J. took no part in the decision. 
28 Prostitution Reference, supra note 8 at para 1. 
29 Ibid at paras 14-19. Dickson C.J.C. found that there was an infringement of the liberty component of  
s 7, but ultimately determined that such an infringement was in accordance with the principles of fun-
damental justice and therefore not unconstitutional. 
30 Ibid at para 107. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen to treat the Prostitution Reference, supra note 8 as a 
vertically binding precedent (for a discussion of vertically binding precedent, see infra section III(i) 
Vertical Precedent); however, I do note that reference decisions are not technically binding. That said, 
most references are treated as binding precedent upon lower courts and are usually followed as such 
when appropriate. As Rinfret C.J.C. stated in Reference re Wartime Leasehold Regulations, [1950] SCR 
124, [1950] 2 DLR 1 at para 3:  
“[r]eferences…merely call for the opinion of the Court on the questions of law or fact sub-
mitted…and the answers given by the Court are only opinions. It has invariably been 
declared that they are not judgments either binding on the government, on parliament, on 
individuals, and even on the Court itself, although, of course, this should be qualified by say-
ing that, in a contested case where the same questions would arise, they would no doubt be 
followed.” 
In fact, as noted above, Himel J. in Bedford recognized and stated that the Prostitution Reference was a 
prima facie binding precedent upon her court: Bedford, supra note 2 at para 66. I also note that the ratio 
decidendi of the Prostitution Reference may be broader or more narrow than the holding which I have 
stated: see Bedford v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONCA 186, 346 DLR (4th) 385, where the major-
ity decision states that the issues decided in Bedford can be distinguished from the issues decided in the 
Prostitution Reference. That said, determining the exact ratio decidendi of the reference is beyond the 
scope of this commentary. For this commentary’s purposes, it is sufficient to note that the impugned 
provisions in the Prostitution Reference were ultimately found to be constitutional, and that Himel J. 
was prima facie bound by such a determination. 
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constitutional.33 As noted above, the constitutionality of two of these provisions, 
namely sections 210 and 213(1)(c), were previously constitutionally considered and 
upheld by the SCC in the Prostitution Reference.34 The applicants challenged all 
three provisions by arguing that such provisions violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the 
Charter, and that these violations could not be saved under section 1.35 
Himel J. noted that although prostitution is not illegal per se in Canada, many 
prostitution related activities are illegal.36 Himel J. further noted that it was Parlia-
ment’s act of legislating such activities illegal, and not the actual act of prostitution, 
which provided the basis for the applicants’ assertion that the government prevents 
prostitutes from being able to conduct “[t]heir lawful business in a safe environ-
ment.”37 Being guaranteed a safe environment to conduct lawful business, the 
applicants asserted, was a right protected by the Charter.38 Each one of the appli-
cants was at one time a prostitute. All asserted, based on experience, that 
prostitution was significantly safer when conducted indoors and through appropri-
ate screening processes.39 
With regards to the binding effect of the Prostitution Reference, the applicants 
argued that the reference was either “[d]istinguishable and/or no longer bind-
ing…” due to the fact that there was new evidence available that had not been 
before the SCC, and that there were also new developments in Charter jurispru-
dence that called the SCC’s decision into question.40 The Attorney General of 
Canada, however, argued the opposite, asserting that there was no basis for Himel 
J. to revisit the issue of constitutionality.41 It is this issue—the applicability and ef-
fect of stare decisis in Bedford and, more generally, trial level Charter analysis—
which is of upmost importance to this paper. Therefore, in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the doctrine of stare decisis, I will now briefly outline and discuss 
the various rules that inform the concept of precedent and the doctrine of stare 
decisis. 
III. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and Rules of Precedent 
Stare decisis is the Latin term that signifies the common law convention of judi-
cial devotion to binding precedent. Literally translated, stare decisis means “[t]o 
stand by decided matters.”42 The complete Latin phrase which explains the doctrine 
in its entirety—i.e. “stare decisis et non quieta movere”—means “[t]o stand by deci-
                                                                                                                                                         
33 See generally Bedford, supra note 2. 
34 Supra note 8. 
35 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 8-13. 
36 Ibid at para 8. 
37 Ibid at para 8. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See ibid at paras 26-43. 
40 Ibid at para 9. 
41 Ibid at para 15. The Attorney General of Canada made further alternative arguments for if Himel J. 
determined that she was able to revisit the issue of constitutionality, but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to consider such arguments. 
42 Gerald L Gall, The Canadian Legal System, 5th ed (Toronto, ON: Thomson Canada Limited, 2004) at 
431; see generally the Dictionary of Canadian Law, 3d ed, sub verbo “stare decisis” [Canadian Diction-
ary].  
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sions and not to disturb settled matters.”43 These concepts together represent the 
common law precept that judges are to follow the decisions of applicable prior cas-
es and are not to revisit issues of law that have already been settled.44 
The doctrine of stare decisis and rules concerning precedent exist in common 
law jurisdictions to help ensure that judges reach the same legal conclusions that 
were reached in previous cases if and when they are faced with similar legal issues 
in future cases.45 When judges do reach the same legal conclusions in such instanc-
es, they create a sense of clarity, predictability, and legitimacy within the law.46 
Consistent decision-making through adherence to precedent also creates legal and 
judicial certainty for all members of society.47 Laskin J.A. of the ONCA articulated 
the inherent values and importance of the doctrine aptly in David Polowin Real 
Estate Ltd. v The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. (“David Polowin”), 
when he stated: 
[t]he values underlying…stare decisis are well known: consistency, cer-
tainty, predictability, and sound judicial administration. Adherence to 
precedent promotes these values…Adherence to precedent also enhanc-
es the legitimacy and acceptability of judge-made law and by so doing 
enhances the appearance of justice. Moreover, courts could not function 
if established principles of law could be reconsidered in every subse-
quent case.48 
In essence, Laskin J.A. is stating that laws need to be reasonably certain so that so-
ciety and its members can suitably function in accordance with those laws and, in 
the constitutional context, so that legislatures can function in accordance with con-
stitutional expectations.49 To achieve these ends, adherence to precedent is 
considered preferable to—and is required as opposed to—unrestrained ad hoc ju-
dicial determinations.  
                                                                                                                                                         
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid; Canadian Dictionary, supra note 41; see generally Debra Parkes, “Precedent Unbound? Contem-
porary Approaches to Precedent in Canada” (2007) 32 Man LJ 135 and David J Murphy & Robert 
Reuter, Stare decisis in commonwealth appellate courts (Toronto, ON: Butterworths, 1981); see also Re 
Canada Temperance Act, [1939] OR 570, 72 CCC 145 at para 70 [Canada Temperance]. 
45 See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 37. 
46 See e.g. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v Ranville, [1982] 2 SCR 518, 139 DLR 
(3d) 1 at 15 [Ranville]; see David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v The Dominion of Canada General Insurance 
Co., (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 161, 199 OAC 266, leave to appeal to the SCC denied: [2005] SCCA No 388 at 
para 119 [David Polowin]; see also Gall, supra note 42. 
47 David Polowin, supra note 46 at paras 119-120. 
48 Ibid at paras 119-120; see also Stuart v Bank of Montreal, 41 SCR 516, aff’d [1911] AC 120 at para 93; 
Barnett v Henderson, [1976] 2 SCR 531, 57 DLR (3d) 225 at para 43; Woods Manufacturing Co v R, 
[1951] SCR 504, [1951] 2 DLR 465 at para 24; R v Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 at paras 52-59 
[Henry]; R v Yeh, 2009 SKCA 112, [2009] WWR 193 at para 112; R v Prokofiew, 2010 ONCA 423, 256 
CCC (3d) 355 at para 35; R v Y (LS), 2009 ABCA 89, 242 CCC (3d) 441 at para 18 [Y (LS)]; R v Cra-
zybull, 141 AR 69, [1993] AWLD 605 at paras 20-21 [Crazybull]; New Brunswick (Minister of Natural 
Resources) v McCoy, 277 NBR (2d) 27, 50 CPC (5th) 298 at paras 5-6; Honesty Property Co v Lemaigre. 
2004 SKCA 28, 241 Sask R 313 at para 4; Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v Fast, 2001 
FCA 373, [2002] 3 FC 400 at para 2 [Fast]. 
49 See David Polowin, supra note 46 at para 119. 
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To guard against these ad hoc determinations, two types of precedents exist: 
vertical precedent and horizontal precedent. In combination, these types of prece-
dent form the critical content of the doctrine of stare decisis.50 Historically, some 
common law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, considered both hori-
zontal and vertical precedents to be absolutely binding.51 The situation in Canada, 
however, is somewhat different. Generally, although Canadian courts do not ac-
tively seek to depart from their horizontal precedents, only vertical precedents 
remain strictly binding in the Canadian context.52 It is this distinction between the 
binding effects of vertical versus horizontal precedents that is vital to explaining 
why Himel J., in Bedford, was mistaken in her reasons with respect to stare decisis. 
(i)  Vertical Precedent 
Canada’s judicial system is hierarchical. In simple terms, it is made up of sepa-
rate jurisdictions of lower trial level courts and higher intermediate level appellate 
courts. There is also one final court of appeal, the SCC, which exercises the highest 
form of judicial authority. SCC authority is binding upon every Canadian jurisdic-
tion and thus every Canadian court of law. It is because of this hierarchical 
structure that vertical precedent exists. When a higher level court makes a pro-
nouncement of law, that pronouncement becomes binding upon all lower level 
courts within the same jurisdiction.53 In other words, such pronouncements create 
vertical precedents that bind all applicable lower level courts.54 As Professor  
Schauer—a legal reasoning and philosophy of law professor at the University of 
Virginia, School of Law—fittingly puts it, 
[l]ower courts are normally expected to obey the previous decisions of 
higher courts within their jurisdiction, and this relationship…is usefully 
understood as vertical…Indeed, we refer to courts as higher and lower 
precisely because higher courts exercise authority over lower ones, an 
authority manifested principally in the obligation of lower courts to treat 
the decisions of higher courts as binding upon them.55 
It follows that since Bedford was a decision of the ONSC, Himel J. was bound by 
decisions of the ONCA and of the SCC; this is because those courts would be con-
sidered higher courts within her court’s jurisdiction. It also follows that because the 
Prostitution Reference was a decision of the SCC, it too was vertically binding upon 
her court. Other decisions of the ONSC, however, would not be considered verti-
                                                                                                                                                         
50 See JD Heydon, “How Far Can Trial Courts and Intermediate Appellate Courts Develop the Law?” 
(Summer 2009) 9 OUCLJ 1 at 3-4. 
51 See The London Tramways Company Limited v The London County Council, [1898] AC 375, [1898] 
UKHL 1. Note that this is no longer the position of the House of Lords: See Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent), [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (HL). 
52 See Parkes, supra note 44 at para 5; see also Henry, supra note 48 at paras 52-59; Fast, supra note 48 at 
para 2; Y (LS), supra note 48 at para 18; Crazybull, supra note 48 at paras 20-21. 
53 See Gall, supra note 42 at 431; see Schauer, supra note 45 at 36; see Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law 
in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto, ON: Carswell, 1992) at 219; see Canadian Dictionary, supra note 41 sub 
verbo “stare decisis”; see e.g. Canada Temperance, supra note 44 at para 70. 
54 Schauer, supra note 45 at 36. 
55 Ibid at 36-37. I note that here Professor Schauer is discussing how precedent functions in the United 
States. Nonetheless, his statement applies as well and in full to the Canadian context. 
42 Clarifying the Role of Precedent Vol. 22 
!
cally binding. Instead, those decisions would form horizontal precedents, the bind-
ing effects of which, as I will now explain, are functionally different. 
(ii)  Horizontal Precedent 
Strictly speaking, the term horizontal precedent56 means that courts are bound 
to follow their own prior decisions.57 That said, Canadian courts apply a more flex-
ible approach to the binding effect of horizontal precedent as compared to the 
more strict vertical precedent.58 Although Canadian courts tend to exercise caution 
and restraint when presented with an opportunity to overrule a horizontal prece-
dent, they nevertheless do not consider themselves absolutely bound by their past 
decisions.59 I will now discuss further the ways in which the SCC, ONCA, and 
ONSC each take a more flexible approach to the binding effect of horizontal prece-
dent. 
The Supreme Court of Canada 
Speaking in relation to horizontal precedent at the SCC level, Cartwright J. (as 
he then was) stated in Binus v The Queen,60 “[I] do not doubt the power of this 
Court to depart from a previous judgment of its own but…I think that such a de-
parture should be made only for compelling reasons.”61 In stating this, Cartwright J. 
was setting the foundation for how the SCC would approach situations involving 
the potential overruling of its own decisions. This foundation has been built upon 
by Cartwright J.’s successors; however, no justice of the SCC has set out a formal 
test aimed at determining when the Court will or will not overrule one of its own 
horizontal precedents. The Court has, however, on a number of occasions, reiterat-
ed the general notion that it would need compelling reasons in order to overrule 
one of its own horizontal precedents.62 All things considered, while it is clear that 
the SCC will overrule one of its previous decisions when it is compelled to do so, 
such a determination will only be made after a careful consideration of the implica-
tions involved. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal 
The SCC’s approach to horizontal precedent is not binding on the ONCA. In 
other words, simply because the SCC approaches horizontal precedent in a certain 
                                                                                                                                                         
56 I will restrict my comments on horizontal precedent to the relevant courts in Bedford, supra note 2, 
namely the SCC, the ONCA, and the ONSC. Although Himel J. in Bedford also cites the Saskatchewan 
Court of Queen’s Bench, this decision is not a horizontal precedent as it is a decision from a separate 
jurisdiction. Such a decision would technically be considered a persuasive authority. 
57 Schauer, supra note 45 at 37. 
58 See generally Parkes, supra note 44 at paras 25-53. 
59 See generally ibid; see R v Bernard, [1988] 2 SCR 833, 45 CCC (3d) 1 at para 28 [Bernard] (per Dick-
son C.J.C.: “There must be compelling circumstances to justify a departure from a prior decision.”); see 
R v Chaulk, [1990] 3 SCR 1303, 62 CCC (3d) 193 at para 103 [Chaulk]; see David Polowin, supra note 46 
at para 126; see also Heydon, supra note 50 at 4. Heydon discusses the role of horizontal precedent in 
the United Kingdom. Its role is similar to that of the Canadian context. 
60 [1967] SCR 594, [1968] 1 CCC 227. 
61 Ibid at 601 [emphasis added]. 
62 See ibid; see Bernard, supra note 59; see Chaulk, supra note 59; see Henry, supra note 48 at paras 44-
46; see R v Salituro, [1991] 3 SCR 654, 68 CCC (3d) 289 at 29 [Salituro]; see R v B (KG), [1993] 1 SCR 
740, 79 CCC (3d) 257 at para 63; see R v Robinson, [1996] 1 SCR 683, [1966] 4 WWR 609 at para 16. 
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way, it does not follow that the ONCA must follow this same approach. This is 
because the SCC has never imposed the approach on lower courts.63 Instead, it re-
mains a policy of sorts for the SCC. Nevertheless, the ONCA has adopted similar 
guidelines to those of the SCC with respect to horizontal precedent and, further-
more, it has chosen to build upon them.64  
Much like the SCC, the ONCA holds the belief that departing from its prior de-
cisions should be the exception—i.e. reserved for special circumstances—rather 
than the norm.65 In contrast to the SCC, however, the ONCA appears to have a 
somewhat stricter view of the binding effect of horizontal precedent. For example, 
even if the ONCA determines that a prior decision of its court is erroneous, that 
determination will not necessarily lead the ONCA to overrule its prior decision.66 
As Laskin J.A. stated in David Polowin, “[a]lthough I have concluded that [a previ-
ous decision of this court is in error], it does not automatically follow that [it] 
should be overruled. The principle of stare decisis—‘stand by things decided’—
comes into play.”67 Instead, the ONCA will only overrule a prior erroneous deci-
sion if there are sufficient reasons to do so.68 Making such a determination will 
involve “weigh[ing] the advantages and disadvantages of correcting the error…”69 
Therefore, although the ONCA is potentially willing to overrule its own precedent, 
it would only do so following a meticulous balancing process and a careful consid-
eration of the implications that would flow from taking such an action. 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
The ONSC adheres to the conformity approach with respect to trial level hori-
zontal precedent.70 This approach was first articulated by Wilson J. in Re Hansard 
Spruce Mills Ltd.,71 a British Columbia trial level decision. That approach was stated 
by Wilson J. as follows: 
[I] have no power to override a brother judge. I can only differ from 
him, and the effect of my doing so is not to settle but rather to unsettle 
the law… 
Therefore…I say this: I will only go against a judgment of another judge 
of this Court if: 
a) Subsequent decisions have affected the validity of the im-
pugned judgment; 
                                                                                                                                                         
63 David Polowin, supra note 46 at para 126. 
64 See ibid at paras 124-143. 
65 See ibid at para 126. 
66 Ibid at para 107. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See Ibid at para 108. 
69 Ibid at para 127; see also R v Neves, 2005 MBCA 112, 202 CCC (3d) 375 at paras 74-94 (this is a deci-
sion of the Manitoba Court of Appeal adopting the views of Laskin J.A. in David Polowin).  
70 See generally Holmes v Jarrett, [1993] ILR 1-2949, 68 OR (3d) 667 at paras 13-27 [Holmes]; see also 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v Phelps, 2010 ONSC 1061, 2010 CarswellOnt 1061 at paras 37-39 [Phelps] 
and Re Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd., [1954] 4 DLR 590, 13 WWR (NS) 285 (BCSC) at paras 4-8 [Re Han-
sard]. 
71 Ibid. 
44 Clarifying the Role of Precedent Vol. 22 
!
b) It is demonstrated that some binding authority in case law or 
some relevant statute was not considered; 
c) The judgment was unconsidered, a nisi prius judgment given 
in circumstances familiar to all trial judges, where the exigen-
cies of the trial require an immediate decision without 
opportunity to fully consult authority. 
If none of these situations exists I think a trial judge should follow the 
decisions of his brother judges.72 
The ONSC formally adopted this approach in Holmes v Jarrett, and recently con-
firmed the adoption in PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v Phelps.73 The trial judges in 
those cases particularly noted that the conformity approach allows for certainty to 
be brought to the law up until the point where an appropriate appellate level court 
is able to finally settle the legal issue(s) in question.74 As I have already canvassed 
above, it is this certainty which is of fundamental importance to our conception of 
law, and which the doctrine of stare decisis assists in achieving. 
(iii)  Authority to Revisit versus Authority to Overrule 
Before moving on to discuss the specific authorities cited in Bedford, it will 
prove advantageous to first clarify the distinction between having the authority to 
revisit a precedent, and having the authority to overrule a precedent. Throughout 
Bedford and the numerous authorities cited therein in reference to stare decisis, 
there is discussion about when courts may revisit and/or reconsider past deci-
sions.75 There is an important distinction between having the authority to revisit 
decisions and having the authority to overrule them—though Himel J. does not 
make note of it in her reasoning—and this distinction is vital to a trial and/or an 
intermediate appellate level court’s Charter analysis. Himel J. seems to suggest that 
the authorities she relies upon stand for the proposition that having the authority 
to revisit necessarily equates to having the authority to overrule. While this sugges-
tion may hold true at the SCC level, it does not hold true for intermediate appellate 
and trial level courts. It therefore follows that such a presumption is to be rejected.  
The authority to revisit a decision must be distinguished from the authority to 
overrule because the two types of authority do not necessarily co-exist. For exam-
ple, a trial level judge may have the authority to revisit a settled issue of law, but 
due to the binding effect of a vertical precedent, that trial level judge may not have 
the authority to overrule the previous decision which settled that issue of law. If the 
trial level judge disagrees with the precedent, then that trial judge is free to criticize 
the precedent’s remaining validity. He or she would not, however, have the author-
ity to overrule it.76 This authority would be reserved for the appellate level court 
that settled the issue of law and created the binding precedent. 
                                                                                                                                                         
72 Ibid. 
73 See Holmes, supra note 70 at paras 12-27; see Phelps, supra note 70 at paras 37-39. 
74 Ibid at para 39. 
75 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 69-83. 
76 See Heydon, supra note 50 at 14. 
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With regard to an intermediate appellate level court, such a court would cer-
tainly have the authority to revisit and overrule one of its own decisions—this is 
consistent with the notion of horizontal precedent. It would also have the authority 
to revisit a precedent of the SCC and offer its views regarding that precedent’s re-
maining validity.77 It would not, however, have the authority to overrule that SCC 
precedent. The authority to overrule would be reserved for the SCC due to the rules 
regarding vertical and horizontal precedent. An intermediate appellate level court 
would be bound by the SCC decision because such a decision would be a vertically 
binding precedent upon that intermediate appellate level court. Conversely, the 
SCC would not be strictly bound by the same decision because such a decision, to 
the SCC, would be a horizontal precedent.  
With the distinction between vertical and horizontal precedent in mind, I now 
turn to discuss the authorities from the various levels of court cited by Himel J. in 
Bedford to support her decision to depart from the binding effect of the Prostitu-
tion Reference. 
IV. Stare Decisis in Bedford: Clarifying the Meaning of the Authorities Cited 
Himel J. relied on authorities from the SCC, ONCA, ONSC, and SKQB in the 
stare decisis section of her decision in Bedford. Given that she specifically designat-
ed a section to stare decisis,78 it can be reasonably inferred that Himel J. understood 
that the doctrine had particular importance to the case. This inference gains par-
ticular support from the fact that Himel J. acknowledged that the Prostitution 
Reference was “prima facie binding” upon her court.79 Unfortunately, however, it 
appears that Himel J. consistently confused and conflated the concepts of horizon-
tal and vertical precedent throughout her reasons with respect to stare decisis. 
Himel J.’s overarching argument, namely that she was not bound by stare decisis, 
incorrectly equated the more flexible approach of horizontal precedent with the 
strict concept of vertical precedent. I will now demonstrate why the authorities 
relied upon by Himel J. do not support such an equivalency. 
(i)  The Supreme Court of Canada 
Himel J. noted that the SCC has the power to revisit its own decisions,80 with 
the implication being drawn from this that the SCC also has the authority to over-
rule its own decisions. While the above discussion clearly demonstrates that both 
these notions are true, the ability of a court to revisit and overrule its own prior 
decisions is quite different from a lower court being able to revisit and overrule a 
higher court’s previous decisions. Again, the reason the SCC has the ability to over-
rule its prior decisions is because it does not consider itself strictly bound by 
horizontal precedent. This limited flexibility with regards to the binding effect of 
                                                                                                                                                         
77 Ibid. 
78 Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 63-83. 
79 Ibid at para 66. 
80 Ibid at para 78 citing Ranville, supra note 46, Bernard, supra note 59, Chaulk, supra note 59, and 
Salituro, supra note 62. 
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horizontal precedent, however, is simply not available with respect to vertically 
binding precedent.  
After noting that the SCC has the authority to revisit its past decisions, Himel J. 
also asserted, in the sentence immediately following, that trial judges may also re-
visit past decisions, but only “[i]n very limited circumstances.”81 This assertion, 
however, would only be correct if it stood for the proposition that trial level judges 
may revisit past decisions of their own court.82 As outlined above, trial judges in 
Ontario may revisit and depart from decisions of other Ontario trial judges if and 
when certain limited circumstances exist.83 The Prostitution Reference however, is 
not a decision of the ONSC, but instead a decision of the SCC. It is vertically bind-
ing in relation to the ONSC, not horizontally binding. Therefore, Himel J.’s 
suggestion that lower courts may revisit previous decisions of higher courts due to 
the fact that SCC precedents state that the SCC may revisit its own decisions is mis-
taken. No SCC authority cited by Himel J. stands for the proposition that lower 
courts may revisit and/or overrule vertically binding precedent. This is not surpris-
ing seeing as the SCC has never made such a pronouncement of law. 
(ii)  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
While Himel J. does make reference to the SCC’s practices regarding horizontal 
precedent, she relies more heavily on the ONCA’s decision in David Polowin. Alt-
hough relying on this decision may seem intuitively logical—because the ONCA is 
a higher level court within her jurisdiction—it is important to fully understand 
Laskin J.A.’s reasoning in David Polowin in order to determine whether Himel J. 
was properly relying on that decision. One should note that Laskin J.A. discusses 
the overall applicability of stare decisis, but only does so in relation to the binding 
effect of horizontal precedent at the ONCA and the SCC. 
Himel J. noted that Laskin J.A. suggests a more flexible approach to stare decisis 
is preferable.84 What Himel J. seems to confuse, however, is the fact that Laskin J.A. 
was only making those comments with respect to whether the ONCA should 
choose to depart from its own prior decisions.85 Further, the SCC authorities cited 
by Laskin J.A. in David Polowin were all discussing stare decisis in terms of depar-
ture from horizontally binding precedents. From these authorities, Laskin J.A. 
gleaned a non-exhaustive list of five factors that the SCC considers when determin-
ing whether there are compelling reasons for it to overrule one of its horizontal 
precedents.86 Laskin J.A. went on to propose a further seven factors that the ONCA 
could consider in overruling one of its horizontal precedents.87 The key point here 
is that Laskin J.A. was developing the law with respect to horizontal precedent at 
the ONCA only, and that such developments provide no direct support for Himel 
                                                                                                                                                         
81 Bedford, supra note 2 at para 78. 
82 I will discuss these authorities cited by Himel J. with regards to trial level judges being able to revisit 
issues of law below at Section IV(3)The Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Section IV(4) The Sas-
katchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. 
83 See section III(ii) Ontario Superior Court of Justice above; see Holmes, supra note 70 at paras 12-27; 
see Phelps, supra note 70 at paras 37-39; see also Re Hansard, supra note 70 at paras 4-8. 
84 See Bedford note 2 at para 68 citing David Polowin, supra note 46 at paras 127. 
85 See David Polowin, supra note 46 at paras 107-145. 
86 Ibid at paras 124-125. 
87 Ibid at paras 130-145. 
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J.’s arguments regarding the (in)applicability of stare decisis in Bedford. Again, the 
result is that Himel J. mistakenly conflated horizontal and vertical precedent in 
supporting her suggestion that she was able to depart from the binding effect of the 
Prostitution Reference. 
In addition, it is important to note that the precedent Laskin J.A. considered 
overruling in David Polowin was one that he considered to be decided erroneous-
ly.88 Himel J. does not make a similar assertion in Bedford. More importantly—and 
somewhat ironic for Himel J.’s reasoning—Laskin J.A. in David Polowin made spe-
cific mention of whether trial level judges have authority to overrule decisions of 
higher level courts. When presented with the argument that trial level judges 
should have such authority, Laskin J.A. definitively stated, 
[t]he insurers go as far as to argue that the motions judge had authority 
to depart from [our precedent] and that he ought to have done so. I do 
not find any of these arguments persuasive… 
…the insurers’ [argument]…has no merit. The motions judge’s ruling 
was entirely appropriate. A fair reading of his reasons suggests that he 
would have decided the motions differently had he been free to do so. 
But he properly considered himself bound to follow [our precedent]. If 
the error…is to be corrected, it falls to this court, not to the motions judge, 
to do so.89 
In light of this, the position of the ONCA, and of the law generally, is actually quite 
clear: trial level judges are to adhere to vertically binding precedent even if they 
believe that the precedent is incorrect. It follows from this that since the Prostitu-
tion Reference was a vertically binding precedent, Himel J. was bound to follow it, 
regardless of whether or not she believed it to be decided erroneously. 
(iii)  The Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
After citing authority—albeit mistakenly—from the SCC and ONCA, Himel J. 
then turned to support her reasoning on the issue of stare decisis through a reliance 
on horizontal precedent from the ONSC.90 Although citing to and relying on hori-
zontal precedent is not incorrect per se, it is important to understand what the cited 
authority stands for as a proposition of law in order to determine whether Himel 
J.’s use of the precedent was appropriate. 
The horizontal precedent which Himel J. relied on was Wakeford v Canada (At-
torney General) [Wakeford].91 In this case, Swinton J. of the ONSC stated, 
                                                                                                                                                         
88 Ibid at para 107. 
89 Ibid at para 117 [emphasis added]. 
90 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 79-80. 
91 81 CRR (2d) 342; 2001 CarswellOnt 352 aff’d (2001), 156 OAC 385, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 
[2002] SCCA No. 72 [Wakeford]. Note: while this case was affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the 
affirmation made no comment on Swinton J.’s suggestions of anticipatory overruling being available to 
trial judges. In fact, the paragraph-long affirmation went as follows: “We appreciate that this appeal 
raises a serious issue. However, we agree with Swinton J. that the issue has been fully settled by the 
[SCC]…Therefore, the appeal is dismissed without costs.” Ultimately, Swinton J.’s suggestions are obiter 
dicta because they had no significant bearing on the outcome of the case, and should be rejected as 
conflicting with the doctrine of stare decisis. 
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It is true that the [SCC] has the power to overrule its past decisions. 
However, a lower Court should not be quick to assume that it will do so, 
given the importance of the principle of stare decisis in our legal sys-
tem…[W]here there is a decision of the [SCC] squarely on point, there 
must be some indication—either in the facts pleaded or in the decisions 
of the [SCC]—that the prior decision may be open for reconsidera-
tion…92 
In essence, Swinton J. is referring to the concept of anticipatory overruling.93 Antic-
ipatory overruling is a concept whereby lower level courts may overrule vertically 
binding precedent if and when they are almost entirely able to anticipate that the 
applicable higher level court will overrule that precedent when given the oppor-
tunity to do so.94 Although it has been argued that anticipatory overruling should 
be available to intermediate appellate level courts95 (for example the ONCA), this 
argument has not been accepted into Canadian law.96 One of the main reasons for 
the non-acceptance is that being able to predict an overruling with sufficient cer-
tainty is an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. As Professor Parkes states in 
her article on the role of precedent, “[t]he reality is that there are very few cases 
where it can truly be said that an overruling by the [SCC] is very likely or inevita-
ble…”97 After reviewing how the notion of anticipatory overruling is viewed in the 
jurisprudence of both Canada and the United States, Professor Parkes correctly 
concludes that the notion of anticipatory overruling has ultimately been rejected.98 
As such, the suggestion by both Swinton J. in Wakeford and Himel J. in Bedford 
that a trial level judge could have the authority to anticipatorily overrule vertically 
binding precedent as a proposed exception to the doctrine of stare decisis is without 
any sound legal foundation. 
(iv) The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench  
Although not technically a horizontal precedent—but instead a persuasive 
precedent—Himel J. also reaches for support from a decision by Laing C.J. (as he 
then was) of the SKQB, namely Leeson v University of Regina [Leeson],99 to assert 
her ability to reconsider the legal issues previously settled in the Prostitution Refer-
ence.100 However, much like Himel J.’s reasoning in Bedford, Laing C.J. in Leeson 
mistakenly conflates the rules of horizontal and vertical precedent and he thus ren-
dered a decision erroneous in law. Like Himel J., Laing C.J. cites Laskin J.A.’s 
reasoning in David Polowin regarding when an appellate court may potentially 
revisit one of its own past decisions.101 It has already been shown, however, that 
                                                                                                                                                         
92 Ibid at para 14. 
93 See generally Parkes, supra note 44 at paras 17-24.  
94 Ibid. 
95 See generally Dale Gibson, “Stare Decisis and the Action Per Quod Servitium Amisit – Refusing to 
Follow the Leader: R v Buchinsky” (1980) 13 CCLT 309. 
96 See Parkes, supra note 44 at paras 21-24. 
97 Ibid at para 22. 
98 Ibid at paras 21-24. 
99 2007 SKQB 252, 301 Sask R 316 [Leeson]. 
100 See Bedford, supra note 2 at para 82. 
101 Leeson, supra note 99 at para 9 citing David Polowin, supra note 46 at para 124 citing Bernard, supra 
note 59, Chaulk, supra note 59, and Salituro, supra note 62. 
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David Polowin does not support the proposition that any court, including lower 
level courts, may revisit settled issues of law by higher level courts.102  
In essence, Laing C.J. in Leeson and Himel J. in Bedford suggest that there is an 
exception to the binding effect of vertical precedent and that this exception specifi-
cally arises if, over a length of time, new facts expose that “[c]ertain social, political, 
or economic assumptions underlying the [precedent] are no longer valid.”103 Himel 
J. relies on what she determines to be a wealth of new evidence and new develop-
ments in sections 7 and 2(b) Charter jurisprudence to justify her departure from 
the Prostitution Reference. While I candidly acknowledge that there may have been 
new evidence and new developments in the Charter jurisprudence applicable to 
Leeson, discussing the merits of these claims is beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
instead important for this paper’s purposes to note that Laing C.J. made the same 
error as Himel J. did in Bedford; namely that he relied on an authority which dis-
cusses the revisitation and overruling of horizontal precedent, and then confused 
and conflated this with the notion of vertical precedent.  
Now, while Leeson suffers from the same shortcomings as Bedford, Laing C.J.’s 
obiter dicta in Leeson seems to hint upon a key procedural inevitability in Charter 
analysis more generally: in order for the SCC to have the opportunity to revisit and 
(potentially) overrule its own settled issues (i.e. its horizontal precedent), the revis-
itation process must necessarily “[c]ommence at the trial court level.”104 It is this 
necessity that raises two fundamental questions in trial level Charter analysis: (1) 
when, if ever, may a trial level judge revisit an already settled issue of constitutional 
law; and (2) is such revisitation reconcilable with the doctrine of stare decisis? With 
these two questions in mind, I turn to proffer a solution to each. 
V.  Retroactive and Prospective Remedies: Inferring the Possibility of  
Precedent Expiration in Charter Analysis 
This paper’s discussion thus far has led to the conclusion that once Himel J. 
acknowledged that the Prostitution Reference was prima facie binding upon her 
court, she had no choice but to adhere to it because it was a vertically binding prec-
edent. This conclusion seems somewhat paradoxical, however, given the 
fundamental principle that the Canadian constitution is meant to be “[a] living tree 
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits…”105 and that this 
growth and expansion is to develop alongside Canadian society over time.106 After 
all, how is Charter jurisprudence to grow and expand if trial level judges are pre-
cluded from revisiting and making new determinations regarding previously 
settled issues in light of new evidence, new changes in Canadian society, and new 
developments in Canadian law? I propose that the answer to this question partly 
lies in a notion that may be called “precedent expiration.” 
                                                                                                                                                         
102 See section IV(ii) The Ontario Court of Appeal above. 
103 Bedford, supra note 2 at para 82-83 citing Leeson, supra note 99 at para 9. 
104 Leeson, supra note 99 at para 9. 
105 See Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] AC 124 (PC), [1929] WWR 479 at para 54.  
106 See Bedford, supra note 2 at para 78 citing ibid; see also Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, 3 SCR 
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Some support for the notion of precedent expiration may be found in the rem-
edies section of R v Hislop (“Hislop”),107 where the SCC discussed the availability, 
use, and applicability of retroactive and prospective remedies in relation to section 
52 of the Charter. This section gives a court the power to strike down unconstitu-
tional laws.108 Hislop centred upon a section 15 Charter challenge that claimed 
subsection 72(1) of the Canada Pension Plan Act109 was discriminatory to same-sex 
couples. It also involved an analysis of whether a successful challenge would give 
rise to either a retroactive or prospective remedy.110 LeBel and Rothstein JJ., speak-
ing for a strong majority, noted that the remedy of striking down a law pursuant to 
subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 can be retroactive, prospective, or a 
combination of both.111 
A retroactive remedy is one where a law is declared invalid and of no force and 
effect from the moment it was made, or at any point in time prior to the present 
day.112 A prospective remedy, on the other hand, is one where a law is declared 
invalid and of no force and effect from the present day onward, or from a certain 
future point in time onward.113 The SCC gave various reasons as to why one type of 
remedy might be chosen as opposed to the other in any one case, but none of these 
reasons are important within the context of this paper.114 Instead, what is im-
portant is that the SCC, through the lens of remedy, suggested that courts may 
identify points in time where a law is to be considered constitutional and/or un-
constitutional. And, in suggesting that there may exist a certain temporal element 
of constitutionality within any one law, one may query whether a more general 
implication can be drawn from this apart from remedy. In my view, such a general 
implication may be so drawn. I suggest that Hislop potentially lends support for a 
novel idea that the constitutionality of a law exists upon a time-based spectrum, 
and that therefore the constitutionality of a law has the potential to change over 
time. In other words, considering that the SCC, albeit again through the lens of 
remedy, has recognized that a law may be unconstitutional prior to or after it is 
actually found to be unconstitutional, it may be suggested that even though a law is 
to be considered constitutional at one point in time, this does not necessarily mean 
that the law will continue its constitutionality in perpetuity. Indeed, this appears to 
be the situation in Bedford, where Himel J. struck down the re-impugned Criminal 
Code provisions because she determined, in light of new legislative and/or social 
facts and new changes in Charter jurisprudence since the Prostitution Reference, 
that the provisions could no longer be considered constitutional.115 Himel J. did not 
argue or rule that the Prostitution Reference was invalid when it was decided in 
1990, but instead reconsidered the overarching issues in the Prostitution  
                                                                                                                                                         
107 2007 SCC 10, [2007] 1 SCR 429 at paras 78-134 [Hislop]. 
108 Ibid; see Charter, supra note 1, s 52. 
109 RSC 1985, c C-8. 
110 See generally Hislop, supra note 107; c.f. Richard HS Tur, “Time and Law” (2002) 22:3 Oxford J Leg 
Stud 463 [Tur]. Tur discusses retroactive and prospective overruling in the context of UK common law, 
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111 Ibid at para 82. 
112 Ibid at para 93. 
113 See ibid at paras 93-95.  
114 See generally ibid at 93-103. 
115 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 3, 70-76, 506-507. 
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Reference—namely the constitutionality of the re-impugned Criminal Code provi-
sions—in light of new findings of fact and developments in Charter jurisprudence 
between 1990 and 2010. 
I would be remiss, however, if I did not concede that Hislop may be distin-
guished from Bedford in several ways. First, Hislop was dealing with constitutional 
remedies and not, as was the case in Bedford, the idea of analyzing a re-impugned 
law’s constitutionality. Second, Hislop was not a decision made by a lower court 
that was bound by a higher court’s precedent. The Bedford decision was the deci-
sion of a lower court being vertically bound by a higher court’s precedent, namely 
the Prostitution Reference. Third—and as a consequence of the first two distinc-
tions—the SCC in Hislop was simply tasked with determining whether a statutory 
provision was invalid, and if so, what the proper remedy would be. (Again, it did 
not have to first deal with issues involving the doctrine of stare decisis and vertically 
binding precedent.) Ultimately then, the SCC in Hislop was concerned with reme-
dy and was not constrained by precedent in the way that Himel J. happened to be 
in Bedford. As such, Bedford contains an extra layer of complexity due to the exist-
ence of a vertically binding precedent.116 Fortunately, in my view, the concept of 
precedent expiration will assist in untangling some of this complexity. 
In gripping upon the suggestion above that the constitutionality of a law has 
potential to change over time, it may follow that upon such a change, a precedent 
once considered vertically binding in the constitutional context might actually be-
come ‘irrelevant’. In other words, when the constitutionality of a law changes at a 
later point in time, a precedent’s applicability after the change might cease to exist 
(i.e. might be expired), thus leaving the state of the law again unsettled. Now, alt-
hough precedent expiration may at first seem similar to lower level overruling 
and/or anticipatory overruling, this paper suggests that precedent expiration is a 
concept both analytically and foundationally distinct from these concepts, each one 
of which is barred by the doctrine of stare decisis while precedent expiration is 
not.117 Indeed, precedent expiration may be conceptualized as a necessary corollary 
of the “living tree” doctrine of the constitution and the inevitability of society’s 
development over time. 
Precedent expiration is a specific doctrine born from the nature of constitu-
tional law itself, and therefore limited to the sphere of constitutional analysis. 
Functionally, it preserves the flexibility required to allow Charter jurisprudence to 
appropriately evolve, while also maintaining fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis. 
It does not challenge the notion that vertical precedent is binding, nor does it vio-
late the notion of precedent more generally; it simply acknowledges that in the 
constitutional context, the length of time that a vertical precedent is binding may 
be limited. 
                                                                                                                                                         
116 I reiterate that for the purposes of this paper I have chosen to treat the Prostitution Reference as a 
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117 C.f. Tur, supra note 110. Tur makes an interesting and somewhat similar claim with respect to the 
common law and precedent. Tur argues that there is a distinction between ‘authoritatively overruling’ 
and the weaker claim of ‘not following’, and although not dealing necessarily with the concept of prece-
dent in the same way as I do, the idea of there being a subtle distinction in precedential concepts is 
similar to the claim I make here where in my view there is a subtle yet crucial distinction between antic-
ipatory overruling and precedent expiration. 
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In addition, one should take note that, unlike lower level overruling and antici-
patory overruling, precedent expiration occurs naturally and independent of action 
by the judiciary at any level. Lower level overruling and anticipatory overruling 
require some sort of direct or indirect judicial action in order to exist. While it is 
conceded that the law will only take notice of a precedent’s expiration upon a judge 
making that very finding—a finding to take place through the specific tests which I 
will propose below—this ‘discovery’ is conceptually different from an overt or, as 
arguably Himel J. has done in Bedford, an obscure overruling. The discovery is an 
acknowledgement that a perfectly valid vertical precedent existed, but due to de-
velopments which have already occurred beyond a specific judge’s control, the 
precedent simply no longer exists and the law, therefore, is no longer settled. In 
addition, it is a discovery brought about by and through a specific doctrinal analy-
sis. If sufficiently new factual evidence is brought forward, and evidence that the 
law has shifted is likewise brought forward, it will become incumbent upon the trial 
judge to fill the void left by the expired precedent. The only way to do this will be to 
consider the constitutional issues de novo (i.e. free from the constraints of a now 
inapplicable vertically binding precedent). 
VI. Precedent Expiration or Permissible Revisitation?  
Before proceeding, I must reiterate that I will not be commenting on the more 
substantive constitutional issues arising out of Bedford. Whether or not the juris-
prudence surrounding sections 7 and 2(b) of the Charter has evolved sufficiently 
enough since the Prostitution Reference to warrant a finding of precedent expira-
tion and/or permissible revisitation, and whether or not there were sufficiently new 
findings of fact to warrant a new section 1 analysis, are both questions better debat-
ed elsewhere. Instead, I turn now to focus on explaining, through a proposed test, 
the one situation where a trial level judge or intermediate appellate level court may 
identify that a precedent has expired, and the two situations where each may revisit 
issues of a law’s constitutionality.  
(i)  Precedent Expiration – The First Situation – A Sufficient Shift in the Law and 
Sufficiently New Findings of Fact 
There is a difference between having the authority to overrule and having the 
authority to revisit.118 There is also a difference between overruling and identifying 
that a precedent has expired. In Charter analysis, and in Canadian law generally, 
lower courts do not have the authority to overrule higher courts due to the doctrine 
of stare decisis.119 At times, however, a lower court will have the authority to revisit 
and/or will be able to identify an expired precedent. In Charter analysis, the latter 
will occur if both questions from the following test can be answered in the affirma-
tive: 
1. Has the jurisprudence surrounding the Charter right developed—since 
the constitutionality of the re-impugned provision was originally set-
                                                                                                                                                         
118 See above section III(iii) Authority to Revisit versus Authority to Overrule. 
119 See above section III(i) Vertical Precedent. 
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tled—to such an extent as to create a situation of a relatively de  
novo analysis of the re-impugned provision? and  
2. Do new social and/or legislative facts exist now that were not under 
consideration when the constitutionality of the re-impugned provision 
was previously settled which oblige the trial judge to revisit the  
section 1 Charter analysis with respect to the re-impugned provision? 
When answered in the affirmative, the first prong of the test gives a trial level 
judge sufficient reason to reconsider a provision’s constitutionality with respect to 
a specific Charter right, while the second prong, when answered in the affirmative, 
gives a trial judge sufficient reason to reconsider the section 1 analysis with respect 
to that provision.120 The first prong emphasizes a sufficient shift in the law, while 
the second prong emphasizes a sufficient shift in the assumptions underlying Ca-
nadian society. But only when both prongs are answered in the affirmative will a 
trial judge be able to identify that a prima facie vertically binding precedent has 
expired due to there being a significant and sufficient shift in both the law and in 
Canadian society in general. The trial judge would be able to engage in a full con-
stitutional analysis and would be free to determine whether the re-impugned 
provision is constitutional or unconstitutional, and, if the latter, would be free to 
grant whatever constitutional remedy is appropriate in the circumstances. This is 
because the previously considered binding precedent would lose its binding effect 
due to the above test’s effect of recognizing that both the law and the facts now in 
consideration have sufficiently shifted from those previously considered.  
The above test provides sufficient restraint on trial judges while also adhering 
to the doctrine of stare decisis. If both prongs are affirmed, the actual legal and fac-
tual issues under consideration will be significantly—and therefore also 
sufficiently—shifted from those of the prima facie binding precedent. Particular 
emphasis must be placed on the fact that both these questions need to be answered 
in the affirmative. An affirmative answer to both questions brings into focus the 
fact that the state of the law and the state of society overall have shifted to such an 
extent that the law, in effect and in reality, is no longer settled. The precedent’s 
expiration leaves the trial level judge with a clean slate from which she or he is able 
to make new constitutional determinations. 
If either one of the questions in the test cannot be answered in the affirmative, 
this will be an indication that the overall state of the law and/or of society has not 
sufficiently shifted to allow the trial level judge to identify that the prima facie ver-
tically binding precedent has expired. The vertically binding precedent would still 
exist and its existence would result in the doctrine of stare decisis precluding the 
trial judge from reaching a final determination different from that of the prima 
facie binding (now wholly binding) precedent. Now, as will be outlined more fully 
below, the trial judge may at this point provide reasons as to why she or he would 
not wish to follow the binding precedent, but she or he will nevertheless still have 
                                                                                                                                                         
120 A s 1 analysis is used to determine whether the infringement of a Charter right is reasonably justified 
in a free and democratic society: see e.g. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 24 CCC (3d) 321; see also Charter, 
supra note 1, s 1. 
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to adhere to the vertically binding precedent because of the doctrine of stare deci-
sis.121 
As a useful thought experiment, I note that Himel J.’s reasons seem to provide 
support for an affirmative answer to both questions in the above test. Himel J. 
notes that there have been developments in both sections 7 and 2(b) Charter juris-
prudence.122 She also notes that there is a wealth of evidence that was not before the 
SCC in the Prostitution Reference that she had the benefit of considering in her 
section 1 analysis.123 The shift in Charter jurisprudence and the availability of new 
facts seems to support an affirmative answer to each of the test’s prongs and, there-
fore, seems to support identifying that the Prostitution Reference’s authority as a 
precedent had expired.  
It is, I think, also useful to briefly consider the above test within the context of 
another recent decision dealing with the analysis of a re-impugned law. As noted at 
the beginning of this paper, in Carter Smith J. of the BCSC struck down certain 
laws in the face of what appeared to be binding vertical precedent. In her decision, 
Smith J. notes that Charter jurisprudence with respect to the principles of funda-
mental justice, especially with respect to gross disproportionality and overbreadth, 
significantly evolved since the SCC had previously considered the constitutionality 
of subsection 241(b) of the Criminal Code in Rodriguez.124 She also notes that the 
legislative and social fact evidence available to her was significantly different as 
compared to that which was available in Rodriguez.125 Therefore, this reasoning, 
like Himel J.’s reasoning in Bedford, seems to satisfy both prongs of the precedent 
expiration test such that Rodriguez, as a precedent, could be considered expired. 
(ii)  Permissible Revisitation – The Second and Third Situations 
If one of the prongs in the precedent expiration test cannot be answered in the 
affirmative, this does not necessarily mean that a trial level judge is precluded from 
revisiting issues of constitutionality. It only means that the trial level judge is pre-
cluded from identifying the precedent as expired, and is therefore unable to escape 
the binding effect of the vertical precedent. The following two situations allow for a 
trial level judge to revisit the constitutionality of a provision, but still require that 
judge to rule in conformity with the vertically binding precedent that is still in ex-
istence and binding upon his or her court. 
The Second Situation: Sufficiently New Findings of Fact Only 
The assumption underlying this situation is that although there may be suffi-
ciently new findings of fact, the jurisprudence surrounding the Charter right has 
not evolved to a degree considered significant, and that therefore the issue is lim-
                                                                                                                                                         
121 See Heydon, supra note 50 at 14.  
122 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 70, 83. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Carter, supra note 3 at paras 973-85. 
125 Ibid at paras 942-48. Having said this, I note that Smith J. is of the view that a change in legislative 
and/or social facts may not always be sufficient to revisit a s 1 analysis. Indeed, she seems to suggest that 
it is only when such a change is coupled with an evolution in s 1 jurisprudence, as she suggests there was 
in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567, will it be appropriate 
to reconsider s 1: see at paras 989-98. 
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ited to a new section 1 analysis. The second situation will occur when both ques-
tions in the following test are answered in the affirmative: 
1. Did the prior decision regarding the constitutionality of the re-
impugned provision determine that the provision infringed a Charter 
right? and 
2. Do new social and or legislative facts exist now that were not under 
consideration when the law was previously settled which sufficiently 
oblige the trial judge to revisit the section 1 Charter analysis regarding 
the re-impugned provision? 
If the first prong is answered in the negative, the lower level court will have no rea-
son to engage in a section 1 analysis because the judge will be bound by the vertical 
precedent which held that there was no Charter violation. However, if both ques-
tions are answered in the affirmative, a trial judge may revisit the section 1 analysis 
and provide reasons as to why she or he would still uphold the provision under  
section 1, or conversely, provide reasons as to why she or he would now find the 
law unconstitutional.126 That said, it must be emphasized that after this analysis is 
complete, the trial judge would still be forced to recognize the binding effect of the 
vertical precedent due to the doctrine of stare decisis.127 The reasons of the trial 
level judge would simply serve to persuade the appropriate appellate level court to 
overrule its prior precedent when and if it has the opportunity to do so. Notwith-
standing that the trial judge may wish to rule differently from a previous decision 
of an appellate court, that trial judge would still be forced to acknowledge that be-
cause of the doctrine of stare decisis, the applicable vertically binding precedent 
precludes him or her from ruling that the law is now unconstitutional. 
I note that this test would also be applicable at intermediate appellate level 
courts when the vertically binding precedent is that of the SCC. The test allows the 
intermediate appellate court to revisit the section 1 analysis and provide its own 
reasons for why the lower court’s reasons were valid or invalid, or why the SCC 
should depart or adhere to its previous decision. The test appropriately leaves the 
redetermination of a provision’s constitutionality to the appropriate level of appel-
late court, while also appropriately leaving findings of newly introduced facts to the 
appropriate lower level court. Ultimately, the test allows for the revisitation of a 
section 1 analysis due to newly found facts, while also ensuring fidelity to the doc-
trine of stare decisis. 
As Laing C.J. rightly noted in Leeson, “[t]here are reasons why earlier decisions 
can and should be revisited, and necessarily such revisitations must commence at 
the trial court level.”128 Commencing revisitation at the trial court level, however, 
does not necessarily mean that identifying a precedent’s expiration at this level is 
available or even doctrinally sound. Commencing revisitation is merely the appro-
priate means for bringing an impugned precedent to the court that has the 
authority to overrule that precedent. Ultimately, the proposed test identifies and 
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127 Ibid. 
128 Leeson, supra note 99 at para 9 [emphasis added]. 
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provides for the proper commencement process, while also abiding by the doctrine 
of stare decisis. 
I note that it appears, at the very least, that Himel J. had the authority to revisit 
the re-impugned Criminal Code provisions’ constitutionality in light of the new 
facts which were placed before her. In Bedford, Himel J. was presented with “[o]ver 
25,000 pages of evidence in 88 volumes, amassed over two and half years…”129 Alt-
hough, again, determining the merit of such evidence is beyond in the scope of this 
paper, such a mass of evidence, if indeed new and relevant, would likely oblige a 
trial level judge to answer the second prong of the above test in the affirmative. If 
the first prong is able to be answered in the affirmative—which in Bedford it is due 
to the fact that the Prostitution Reference found subsection 2(b) to be infringed—it 
would be permissible for that judge to engage in a new section 1 analysis, with the 
necessary understanding that she or he would still, in the end, be bound by the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
The Third Situation – A Sufficient Shift in the Law Only 
Under this third situation, there are no new facts in existence. Moreover, it is 
important to remember that in this situation there is still a vertically binding prec-
edent in existence. And, further, there is an assumption underlying this situation 
that the re-impugned provision is being challenged under the same right that it was 
challenged under prior. This is an important assumption because the shift in law 
that this situation refers to is a shift in law within the right itself. The ultimate de-
termination of constitutionality, therefore, would have to be determined by the 
same court which settled the issue of the re-impugned provision’s constitutionality. 
This is because such a determination would involve potential overruling. Thus, for 
example, if the SCC held that a provision was constitutional under section 7 of the 
Charter, the overruling of that decision, regardless of developments in section 7 
jurisprudence since the original SCC decision was decided, would have to be an 
overruling by the SCC. This, again, is due to the doctrine of stare decisis and the 
rules governing vertical and horizontal precedent.130  
The third situation permitting revisitation occurs when the question in the fol-
lowing test is answered in the affirmative: 
1. Has the jurisprudence surrounding the Charter right developed—since 
the constitutionality of the re-impugned provision was originally set-
tled—to such an extent as to create a situation of a relatively de novo 
analysis of the re-impugned provision? 
If this question cannot be answered in the affirmative, the vertically binding prece-
dent would preclude the trial level judge from revisiting the issue of 
constitutionality. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, however, a 
trial judge would be free to provide reasons as to why she or he believes the re-
impugned provision still does not infringe the applicable Charter right, or con-
versely, provide reasons as to why she or he believes that the re-impugned law now 
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130 See above section III The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and Rules of Precedent. 
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indeed infringes the applicable Charter right.131 Much like the second situation, 
however, the determination reached at the end of the Charter analysis would not be 
the final determination unless that determination was to be in conformity with the 
vertically binding precedent. The trial judge would still be precluded from reaching 
a determination that is different from the vertically binding precedent due to the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  
The trial judge may commence revisitation in this instance due to an acknowl-
edgement that the once settled law may have developed to cast a penumbra of 
doubt around the precedent’s continued applicability. Nonetheless, this would not 
be enough to allow the trial judge to depart from the precedent because the doc-
trine of stare decisis would encompass that penumbra. The acknowledgement will 
only provide an opportunity for the trial judge to call into question the remaining 
viability and validity of the binding precedent. 
The ultimate determination of the precedent’s remaining viability and validity 
is to be reserved for the appellate court that last settled the issue, or for the SCC as 
the final court of appellate jurisdiction. This is doctrinally sound according to the 
doctrine of stare decisis because: (1) it adheres to the exception within the doctrine 
in which horizontal precedent may be overruled by the same level court that creat-
ed the precedent; and (2) it adheres to the notion of vertical precedent by 
recognizing that the SCC reserves ultimate authority to settle and resettle issues of 
law. A trial judge’s reasoning as to how the law developed may carry enough weight 
to compel a higher level court to overrule its previous decision or it may not. 
Again, while authority to revisit does not necessarily equate to authority to over-
rule, revisitation must commence at the trial court level.132 Ultimately, when the 
above test is answered in the affirmative, it acknowledges the appropriate oppor-
tunity for a trial level judge to commence revisitation when she or he is presented 
with the situation of a shift in Charter right jurisprudence. 
Whether or not the law applicable to sections 7 and 2(b) of the Charter suffi-
ciently developed to allow Himel J. to revisit the constitutionality of the Criminal 
Code provisions is, again, beyond the scope of this paper. That said, Himel J. did 
note that there were developments in these areas of the law.133 Therefore, if the de-
velopments in each area can be viewed as sufficient to create a situation of a 
relatively de novo analysis of sections 7 and 2(b) generally, one would be forced to 
acknowledge that it would have been permissible for Himel J. to revisit the consti-
tutionality of the Criminal Code provisions with respect to these two rights. The 
same reasoning, of course, would apply to the Carter decision.  
                                                                                                                                                         
131 See Heydon, supra note 50 at 14. Although JD Heydon is not speaking in regard to Charter rights, he 
is speaking in regard to a lower court’s right and ability to criticize a precedent which is binding upon it. 
132 See Leeson, supra note 99 at para 9. 
133 See Bedford, supra note 2 at paras 70, 83. A Similar argument could be made regarding Carter, supra 
note 3, especially with respect to whether the principles of fundamental justice have evolved since the 
SCC decision of Rodriquez, supra note 8. 
58 Clarifying the Role of Precedent Vol. 22 
!
VII. Conclusion 
While Bedford is a controversial decision due to its inherently divisive subject 
matter, it need not be controversial doctrinally. Unfortunately, the stare decisis 
section of Himel J.’s decision in Bedford is doctrinally unsound as presented. Himel 
J.’s seemingly consistent confusion and conflation of the rules governing vertical 
and horizontal precedent simply does not accord with the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Stare decisis and the rules regarding precedent are bedrocks of the Canadian judici-
ary and of Canadian law generally and are to be adhered to at all times. 
Fortunately, this required adherence can be reconciled with the inevitable evolu-
tion of society and Charter rights jurisprudence through proper Charter analysis at 
trial and intermediate appellate court levels.  
Bedford is an important case because it presents a relatively unique scenario: a 
trial level court faced with reconsidering constitutional issues in light of new evi-
dence and new Charter developments that have taken place over an approximately 
20 year period. The Charter analysis in Bedford is complex, with regular constitu-
tional issues being compounded by the doctrine of stare decisis, which includes the 
rules governing vertical and horizontal precedent. That said—and as has been ar-
gued throughout this paper—this complexity is navigable upon a closer inspection 
of the nature of constitutional law and the role of stare decisis in a trial level court’s 
Charter analysis. And, in particular, this complexity is most easily navigable with 
the aid of the “three situations” framework outlined above.134 Ultimately then, alt-
hough the Bedford decision is quite complicated due to the doctrine of stare decisis 
and the rules of precedent, the concepts of precedent expiration and permissible 
revisitation provide an appropriate conceptual and analytical framework to be used 
by trial and intermediate appellate level courts in a Charter analysis involving in-
stances of re-impugned legislative provisions. 
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